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November 2001, Fighting Terrorism


Terrorism

The acts of aggression of a generally small group of people who want to make a statement about in their opinion an unjust situation are mostly defined as terrorism. The act has to be visible and is mostly pretty bloody to get as much attention as possible. All to often innocent bystanders, civilians, are the victims as government officials are more difficult to get and the impact would not have been that dramatic.
Terror organizations, no matter their scale, are all to often difficult to eliminate as they present a subgroup with their own culture and values. If they are used to work covertly the members will be unknown. This is especially true if the organization has been forced to operate underground as the group was considered hostile and dangerous to the society or better the government in charge. The existing members from the early period will be known but new recruits, people, will be unknown and will only become visible if caught after an attack.

The organization of terrorist groups

There a large number of terrorist groups in the world. Many countries have been hit by the actions of those groups. The terrorist group is the first stage of a rebellion against the sitting government and if the terrorist group becomes larger and the ideas find widespread following and acceptance in the population the next stage of taking over power can be started.
The majority of terrorist groups work according the principle of Lenin of an advanced guard who is fighting the suppressive government with all means at their disposition. The group has to be very secretive to avoid being detected and eliminated.
To be that secretive the majority of the terrorists work out of a cell structure with numerous cells working throughout a country, or for that matter all over the world, with the goal of undermining the government. Every cell is doing that what is supposed to be beneficial to the group's cause. And the strength of the cell structure is that no one knows to much of other cells and the structure of the organization making infiltration and eliminating the terrorist group more difficult and time consuming. The cell leader knows one member of one other cell but nobody knows about the whole group, or better the structure/organization of a terrorist group.
There are essentially two kind of operations, they can be local and/or executed by one cell without other parts of the organization having any knowledge of the act being planned or who did it until the act is claimed. Even the leadership can have no knowledge of the act being planned and would only be informed if the act is executed or just before execution.
Or the operation is carefully planned and executed by the leadership with one or more cells supporting the execution often without knowing what each person and each cell is doing. The common procedure is that one group, cell, is doing intelligence work about a project, an other group, cell is preparing places to stay and transport at the location, an other group, cell, is responsible for the delivery of the weapons and explosives and finally an other group, cell, is responsible for the attack. With this construction only the last group will be informed about what and when to attack, making an interception much more difficult. All other groups are only supporting and they do not know much because they do it more often without that something happens, it happens at a much later moment or it is considered not worthwhile by the leadership.
The second kind of operation is the most dangerous as it is planned and executed by professionals and is therefore more effective and more difficult to end and eliminate. Security is at all times maintained, information is gathered about several objects without any certainty that the object will become a target for an attack. Houses and cars are leased and bought more often even as an investment opportunity. Weapon storages are created also more often for possible later use and several small storages are more difficult to eliminate than a couple of large storages.
The picture gets even more dangerous as different terrorist groups in the world, with all different and little to non common interests occasionally meet, co-operate and support each other. This co-operation is out of the need that all are operating against a mostly more powerful opponent, e.g. a government of a country, Through the rule of interdependency between the nations of the world, countries in the world co-operate and so do the terrorist groups. Weaknesses can be improved and modus of operandi can be exchanged to improve the fight against the opponent.
The communication within the group and between different groups is face to face or through covert means like the internet. The internet with websites and chatboxes offer many opportunities to hide and exchange information between members of the group and between groups. Telephone, fax and e-mail messages are prone to being intercepted by the security services around the world and it makes the identification and location of the people messaging each other more likely.

The elimination of terrorist groups

Terrorist groups are difficult to eliminate as they are covering themselve and use all methods available to evade being captured. If the terrorist groups belong to a non-western culture the identification and capture of the group will become even more difficult.
The apprehension of a terrorist group is a time consuming affair as getting information on a group is difficult and capturing one person or even a couple of cells will not damage the group that much. The elimination of terrorist groups is a long and structured process, you must identify the group, its goals, the structure, the operations methods and the relations outside the group. The creation of such a profile is possible by signal intelligence, SIGINT, communications intelligence, COMINT, and of course human intelligence, HUMINT.
SIGINT and COMINT are possible without that much difficulty. Both are in the preparation of the profile very helpful. To get more delicate information on for example structure and methods HUMINT will be necessary. HUMINT can deliver the information needed to eliminate a terrorist group.
The placing of covert operatives in terrorist organizations is however a dangerous, difficult and time consuming affair as the operative has first to enter the group and subsequently has to work his way up the hierarchy in a group.
To enter a group is already difficult as most groups are relatively small, paranoid and mostly know each other or their families from the region of origin. Especially the non western groups are very incrowd and some relation between the members is present from the beginning.
The operative has to come from the same group to be succesful and be given time, freedom and support to enter the group. Any pressures to deliver information quickly could be damaging to his position.
If a complete group profile is created the group can be eliminated and the majority of cells can be arrested. This however is not enough as the cause of terrorism has to be eliminated. The causes are mostly in some perceived or actual unfair treatment or situation of a given group of people. This situation must be changed to forego a resurrection of a same kind of group.
The elimination of terror is a case of a political, economical and law enforcement solution. Those three are able to eliminate the causes and the consequences of terrorism. Everything less will only be a part solution.

Afghanistan 2001

The case of the Al Qaeda is an example of the difficulties in defeating terrorism. The Al Qaeda is a highly capable organization with a firm base and an extensive network of cells and with many relations to other terrorist organizations. The Al Qaeda is even more difficult to defeat as it receives the support of a country, Afghanistan.
The situation in Afghanistan is very difficult and dangerous as a country, the dominating group in a country, the Taliban, is actively protecting and supporting terrorist organizations. Or of course in the view of the Taliban, people with the same ideas who fight the unjust treatment of muslims in the world. And as always it just takes a little to perceive a bad treatment. And the Taliban have a missionary conviction, they want to share the faith with as many people as possible.
The Taliban is protecting the Al Qaeda organization led by Osama bin Laden which is supporting and guiding many other muslim organizations in the world. The information on the Al Qaeda is rudimentary as it could operate for a long time without to much control with support of in the first place the Taliban but also with covert support from many fundamentalistic social/relief organizations in Arab and muslim countries.
The Al Qaeda received more attention from the intelligence community in the world as the attacks which were supported by the Al Qaeda became more intensive and the scale of the network of the Al Qaeda became visible. Not withstanding the large scale of the Al Qaeda they became really known, targeted and tracked after the 11 September 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
The 11 September was the turning point for the Al Quada, before they could live in a protected environment in Afghanistan and with no much opposition from the Arab and muslim world. Afterwards the Arab and muslim countries had to choose a side.
The Taliban and Afghanistan are since then targeted by the international community in general and the U.S. and the U.K. in particular. Air strikes and Special Forces operations have since then be the name of the game in an attempt to destroy the Taliban and the Al Qaeda organization.
The first targets could be reached with little difficulty, the infra structure of the Taliban could be destroyed and some units of the Taliban could be hit but the fighting power on the short term is still more or less intact. The Special Forces raids could create some instability and hit the Taliban but all these actions is anything far away from forcing the Taliban into a defeat.
The operations in Afghanistan will therefore continue as before but with the air strikes changing from the infra structure to Taliban combat units and the front line with the Northern Alliance. The number of targets like infra structure, barracks and headquarters will become rare in Afghanistan. Special Forces will also continue to operate inside Afghanistan and operate as reconnaissance, forward air control and with hit and run operations. And as long as the Special Forces teams are not directly landed into a Taliban unit the number of casualties will remain controllable or acceptable. If casualties can be acceptable.
The establishment of camps in Aghanistan to support the operations in the country is a good idea out of a logistic view and to help in an emergency but dangerous as it presents a clear target for the Taliban. Even a camp in the north of the country, in alliance held territory, will present a magnet to all suicide bombers in the country.
The best strategy in Afghanistan is to remain on distance and attack with air strikes and Special Forces operations where and when you please as this will hurt the Taliban the most, they will destabilize the Taliban. The Taliban, the enemy, can be hit and the losses and costs on the own side can be limited. The air strikes are defeating any larger opposition and concentrations of Taliban forces and are like some kind artillery for the Northern Alliance and the Special Forces operating in Afghanistan. The Special Forces operations are the best way to meet the small units of the Taliban without giving the Taliban the advantage of using their geographic knowledge of the country side. The fast in and out operations are like some kind of guerilla war against the Taliban. The Taliban can be ambushed and severely limited in their movement. This kind of warfare is exactly the same what the Afghan resistance did to the armoured dominated Soviet occupation forces from 1980 to 1988 but now the Taliban is attacked without giving a change to fight.
The Northern Alliance can in the same time keep the pressure on the Taliban and conquer some terrain they had lost in previous campaigns against the Taliban. A defeat of the Taliban by the Northern Alliance is at the moment not possible for the Northern Alliance as they are to weak and fragmented to make a big impact on the short term.
The strength of the Taliban is thereby still uncertain as the knowledge about the fighting power, the capabilities and numbers, of the Taliban are not exactly known and the effects of the air strikes are unpredictable. The structure of the Taliban forces, mostly light units, armed with assault rifles, grenade/AT launchers, some artillery and even lesser armored vehicles, makes them very mobile and the effectiveness of air strikes lower than desired. The fighting power of the Taliban should not be underestimated as they remain good fighters in a head on engagement, they have the stamina and the will to fight on if they want. Afghan fighters are battle hardened and willing to take losses, running away is not their game. But the Aghan fighters, or better their leaders can be persuaded to change their minds, e.g. change sides.
The operations in Afghanistan are because of the above mentioned factors a long term affair unless, unexpectedly, the leadership of the Taliban can be eliminated and/or an increasing number of the Taliban forces walk over to the other side. Something not uncommon in Afghan politics that the warlords change sides if it is beneficial for their group or clan.