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September 2001, A note on Warfare
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September 2001, A note on Warfare
The use of armed forces in the future, Heavy vs Light Forces
Since the end of the cold war, the bi-polar world, the political
landscape has changed dramatically. A large number of states in the
western world cashed in the socalled peace dividend, lowered the
expenditures of defence and decreased the number of forces under
arms. There was a widespread believe that conflict and the chance of
new conflicts had been over. The opposite proved to be true, new and
old suppressed conflicts came alive and demanded the attention of the
world community.
The nature of the conflicts had changed, as the world had formerly
prepared itself to fight one big conflict between the two ideological
blocs, the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R, or a more or less controlled
representative war in a rather unimportant country between two
ideologically different groups each linked to one of the superpowers.
The new conflicts, internal conflicts and conflicts between two or
more countries were of a different character and intensity. And above
all most of them are little to none controllable.
The developed nations of the world wanted to do something to meet
the pressures and dangers from the new actors and nature of the
conflicts. The developed nations had to do something new to make up
the lapse in capabilities since the demise of the East-West conflict
and the speed with which new conflicts developed and which were
relatively immune to political or even economical pressure.
New and lighter forces are to be introduced which could be available
on a very short time span on every place in the world. Or better
nearly every place. Together with these new lighter forces a new
doctrine had to be invented when and how to use the light forces.
The return of the Light Brigade
Light forces, e.g. light cavalry and infantry, have existed since
many years and were mainly used for reconnaissance, counter attack,
surprise and other kind of missions where speed and deployability
were the most important conditions. The speed and deployability had
of course their price as protection, armour and support and logistics
were less important and only rudimentary available.
In the years of the cold war light forces, airborne and infantry
units, were of lesser importance and only used in support of the
heavy forces which dominated the stand off. War and conflict was seen
as a fight between large heavy armored forces rolling over the plains
of Western Europe.
After the demise of the Soviet Union, the large armored threat out of
the east disappeared making the existence of the large heavy armored
formations less important. The conflicts which emerged after the cold
war were less intensive and mostly combat between lightly armed
forces, often even nothing more than armed para-militaries or
guerilla forces against a light and outdated armed government army.
The place of combat was thereby often far from the developed world in
less developed areas which are geographically beneficial to the use
of light forces, e.g. mountainous, forested and remote areas.
The developed western world needed forces which would be able to
react quickly and move fast without long deployment times and the
need for host nation support en route or in country. The use of heavy
armored forces, which require a relatively long time of deployment
and more infra structural support, were therefore more or less
excluded. The geographic condition further promoted the use of lesser
armored vehicles and/or forces, e.g. light forces.
The need to modernize the forces, the need to react adequately to the
new military demands ergo the need for light fighting vehicles and
the economic benefits of replacing the heavy armored forces which are
expensive to acquire, maintain, operate and deploy with lighter
vehicles sounded very attractive to the military and especially to
the finance departments.
The light forces returned to the spotlight and nearly all developed
countries have some kind of program to re-introduce the light forces
as a substantial part of the armed forces. There is not only an
increase in airborne forces but also in light infantry or better the
above mentioned units which use the light armored vehicles.
The light infantry is fast to deploy over considerable distances as
they can be airlifted in large quantities. They are very mobile in
their movements as they are fast and agile. They have enough fire
power to eliminate the targets they most likely will meet in the
expected low to medium intensity warfare. Superior intelligence,
information warfare and fire power of lightweight artillery and
missiles should further deliver the punch to win in a combat
situation.
The main fighting power with the light units are the people fighting
in the units. The vehicles are only a support element to bring them
form A to B in relative safety and to give some fire support. The
kind of operations which are momentarily in high demand, Peace
Support Operations, PSO, or Peace Enforcement Operations are very
good executable with these kind of forces. Manpower, mobility with
enough firepower and stamina are considered the elements to make
those operations successful. These are the reason why light forces
are that popular again.
Armored vs Light units
The heavy armored forces which dominated the army landscape for
several decades have been on the losing side. The heavy units have
been cut in modernization, maintenance and operation budget. The air
force, navy and even the infantry, airborne and special forces
elements in the army received more attention. The heavy forces were
considered less worthwhile as their use was in the PSO, peace
enforcement operations on the first sight not that important and
useful.
This could occur firstly out of the wish the save funds as the
defence departments received lesser funds each year as other social
and budget/financial problems seemed to be more important and got a
bigger part of the cake. Secondly strategic questions like the
increased use of the armed forces in PSO operations under the flag of
the United Nations draw more attention than the armored forces which
only seem to play a minor role in the majority of the PSO operations.
The question here is what is the position of the armored forces in
the future. Do they deserve the role which they have been forced upon
during the last couple of years? Are armored units representing only
a small part of the army mainly to be tasked to defend the country
from an attack and in the secondary role of supporting the light
forces, infantry and airborne forces, in PSO operations?
The capabilities of armored forces have been greatly underestimated
in recent times merely on the fact that they are more expensive and
especially because they more difficult and slower to transport over
large distances. And of course because they have been used
incorrectly in a couple of conflicts. The most clear example of the
ill use of armored forces has been the Russian operation to conquer
Grosny, Chechnya, in the first Chechnyan uprising. A Russian company
of Russian T-80 main battle tanks, MBTs, were destroyed in the
attempt to take and hold Grosny. They were eliminated with an ease
not only destroying the name of a rather good MBT, the T-80, but also
discrediting the use of armored warfare in future conflicts.
Disregarding all historic knowledge of using MBTs in warfare, the MBT
has to be accompanied with infantry to secure the area especially in
all close in fighting. Even the highly capable and much praised
Israeli Defence Force learned this lesson on the hard way in the Yom
Kippur war in 1973 when they used MBT only formations without the
necessary support of armored infantry and artillery. Previous
experiences in the six day war in 1967 delivered that good results
with MBT dominated units and the idea that the Middle East was not
Europe where infantry and artillery support are absolutely necessary
was the reasoning behind the move to have MBT only units. However the
introduction of effective Anti Tank missiles and as the fighting
closed in the MBT became vulnerable and could be destroyed by the
opposite forces. The fighting power and morale of the IDF had been
severely undermined by this heavy loss of MBTs and casualties.
In all wars the strength of an army depends on the co-operation of
the combined arms team of MBTs, infantry and of course artillery and
air support. They are equal partners in the equation. If one is
considered less important the chance for success will diminish.
The MBT in the combined arms team has an important role even in urban
warfare, the kind of warfare considered unsuitable for MBTs. All
depends how to use the MBT, in what position. All parts of the
combined arms team should be used flexible, in urban warfare infantry
takes the leading role in open warfare the MBT will take the leading
role but each is less useful without the other. The strengths of all
should be used most beneficially to the team and all have a place.
The combined arms team can maximize the possibilities and minimize
the vulnerabilities, so increasing the fighting power of the unit and
their chance on success.
The MBT is even useful in urban warfare if some rules are respected,
and violating these rules could mean the destruction of the MBT. The
MBT has to operate in the combined arms team, all movements has to be
covered by the accompanying infantry, no spearhead operations, the
MBT is to be used in urban warfare as a support and defensive weapon,
not as a system to enforce a breakthrough and of course the MBT
should not stay to long in one place to attract the attention of the
enemy as the MBT remains a great trophy to destroy.
Conclusion
The world has changed since the demise of the Soviet Union and the
end of the controllable conflicts of the bi-polar system. New
conflicts emerged with other demands on the defence forces. There
grew a demand for military units which could be deployed quickly over
large distances and could operate without to much support and if
possible were not to expensive.
The light units, infantry with wheeled light armored vehicles and
airborne units fulfilled this demand. Efforts have been put in place
by a large number of developed countries to increase the number of
these units in the last couple of years to have a large number of
these forces available to be used.
This at the expense of the existing armored units which are
considered less useful and valuable in PSO operations. This trend is
likely to continue in the coming years but it could proof to be a to
big investment into one kind of system with in the end a big headache
as the light forces could not meet all demands. Or better met an
opponent which has been to strong. The dominance of the MBT in the
cold war period is over but to replace them with light armored
vehicles could therefore be short sighted on the medium to long term.
There is a need for a balanced defence force to encounter all
possible eventualities including the defence of the homeland and
expedition operations against a stronger opponent then the now
encountered light armed units or para-military units which can be
controlled by the light forces.
The defence forces of the future should be combined arms teams and
they should be integrated at the lowest level possible. For example
the brigade should be a combat formation with heavy armored units,
armored infantry, light infantry and artillery.
They should train to co-operate on the lowest level to maximize the
effects of all systems. If the co-operation between the heavy, light
and artillery units is running correctly it can outmaneuver and
outfire all existing and future opponents.
Combat operations can only be executed correctly if all three work
together and use their strengths. If only one part is used and others
neglected it will just be a matter of time before they will meet an
opponent who will destroy the strength of one system and tactic.
Remind the Russian experience in Grosny or even better the Israeli
one in the Yom Kippur war in 1973.
A comprehensive defence force with the strategy and tactics to use
the capabilities of the combined arms team is the only way to avoid
tragic incidents as happened if parts were left out. There are no
short cuts to success and security. It is an all or nothing game and
light only is just to little to make it if the going get's tough.
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